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The concept of disinterested discussion is undoubtedly relevant and 
fruitful from a general philosophical standpoint, but it only corresponds in 
politics to a limit or extreme situation.  To try and make it a central category 
in the analysis of representative government would be treat human beings 
as if they were angels. 
 
Bernard Manin, Principes du gouvernement représentatif (1996: 
255; author’s translation) 
 
 
Democratic deliberation is an aspiration that, in the most favorable conditions, 
remains difficult to achieve.  Ideally, a shared public sphere must exist, and it should 
make possible a minimum of authentic communication over important collective values 
and objectives.  In divided or multinational societies, these requirements appear 
particularly daunting.  For one thing, there may not be much of a common public sphere, 
or the public sphere may not offer equal access to all groups and identities.  Further, the 
prevailing standards for acceptable reasons and arguments may not be the same for all 
(Chambers, 2003: 321-22). 
 
In a recent article, John Dryzek identifies two possible responses to the difficulties 
posed by divided societies, and proposes a third approach of his own (2005).  The first 
response, which he calls ‘agonism,’ stresses the irreducible character of differences over 
identity, and favors engagement and contestation over conciliation, accommodation, and 
joint decisions.  This solution may be respectful of diversity, but it does not appear very 
conducive to truly shared democratic practices.  At the opposite end, a second 
response, which Dryzek associates with the idea of consociationalism and presents as 
‘analgesia,’ suggests to put aside divisive issues, avoid direct deliberation among 
constituents, and simply trust elite bargaining.  In both instances, the problem of divided 
societies is solved by avoiding rather than by allowing genuine democratic deliberation 
over common purposes.  Unsatisfied with these responses, Dryzek proposes his own 
approach, which favors a careful but circumscribed engagement of citizens through 
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issue-specific networks, with a focus on concrete needs rather than on more ambitious 
questions of identity, shared and divergent values, and constitutional arrangements.  
Canada, the author argues, offers a good example.  Or, more precisely, Canada does so 
when it is not engaged in constitutional debates, which tend to end up in “deadlock, 
frustration, and failure” (2005: 235).  It is indeed after constitutional failures, when it 
shifts to inaction, that Canada seems to Dryzek “at its best, because individuals on the 
various sides can then get back to engaging one another in the public sphere where 
struggle over sovereignty is not at stake.  Political leadership can get back to the modus 
vivendi that makes Canada such a generally successful society.  The peace is disturbed 
only by political philosophers who believe a constitutional solution is required” (2005: 
235-36). 
 
Compared to the consociational, ‘analgesic’ response, Dryzek’s solution allows 
some deliberation, but only in a circumscribed way, over a narrow range of questions.  In 
doing so, it leaves aside the very issues that make divided societies a challenge for 
democratic theory, and offers a solution that appears both unstable and unsatisfying.  
Unstable, first, because issues of identity and power-sharing simply cannot be wished 
away; social actors will make sure they are not forgotten, especially if the identities they 
promote are denied (Smith, 2003: 157).  Unsatisfying, also, because in divided societies 
unaddressed issues of identity and recognition create or perpetuate injustice.  They also 
tend to poison all democratic deliberations, even over mundane bread and butter issues 
(Kymlicka, 1998: 146-81). 
 
This being said, Dryzek is on the right track because he poses the problem in a 
concrete way and seeks responses that allow both the expression of differences and the 
possibility of genuine deliberation across deep social divides.  In this article, I propose to 
take a few additional steps in this direction, through a more systematic discussion of the 
recent Canadian experience with deliberation over constitutional issues.  For Dryzek, 
this experience was not positive and only ended in “deadlock, frustration, and failure.”  
Many Canadians think so as well.  Even if this were true, as a real-world test for 
democratic theory this experience would remain in many ways enlightening.  For one 
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thing, it took place in an old and stable parliamentary democracy, with the best possible 
conditions for free and open debates.  Even secession is, in Canada, a legitimate option.  
In addition, for a divided society Canada is remarkably peaceful and integrated.  The 
country is an old federation, which has always been multinational, at least implicitly, and 
it has learned to live with divisions and with complex governance arrangements.  The 
conditions for deliberation, then, were as favorable as they could be, considering the not 
so harmonious universe of divided societies. 
 
In fact, the Canadian experience is not simply a story of deadlock and failure.  
The constitutional debates of the last thirty years have also contributed to deepen 
democracy in the country.  In the past, Canadian constitutional politics was seen 
primarily as a bargaining game among elites.  By contrast, contemporary constitutional 
debates were difficult, but they also opened new possibilities for democratic deliberation.  
Principles were invoked and debated broadly, and citizens became engaged and they 
expected to be heard. 
 
In the end, it is true, this deepening of democracy has led to a political impasse.  
Not only are the constitution and core political institutions now apparently impossible to 
change, but the very idea of discussing reforms seems unwise, if not foolish.  By 
extension, non-constitutional, ‘normal’ politics has evolved along similar lines, with elite 
bargaining and power politics often prevailing over democratic deliberation, or even over 
collaborative intergovernmental relations (Noël, 2003a).  As the number of active 
participants increased and as the range of issues under consideration broadened, the 
capacity and willingness to address them in a meaningful way seemed to decrease.  In 
the words of Dryzek, democratic gains with respect to the “franchise” and the “scope” of 
political debates have apparently been made at the expense of “authenticity,” the 
capacity to engage substantively and genuinely in democratic deliberation (1996: 5).  
The opening of the constitutional process effectively has led to a closure of the political 
debate. 
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What are we to make of this contradictory evolution?  Among Canadian political 
scientists and philosophers, some see a causal relationship between democratic 
openness and political closure, and argue that the accommodations or compromises 
necessary to make a multinational federation work cannot be achieved if citizens are too 
directly involved.  They deplore the democratic evolution of the last decades, and 
contend that ‘analgesia’ and the status quo are probably the country’s best options.  
These authors lament, more or less openly, a less deliberative and simpler past.  Others 
see democratization and even ‘agonism’ as positive and, in any case, unavoidable 
developments, and display more confidence in the public’s capacity to deliberate and 
reach workable solutions.  For them, Canada must move beyond the status quo and can 
only do so through further democratic deliberations.  These authors express a guarded 
optimism, anchored in a relatively positive view of Canadian civic life.  In between are a 
number of observers of Canadian political life who find appealing the democratic 
evolution of recent years, but worry about the difficulties such an evolution entails in a 
multinational federation that has left unaddressed many fundamental issues. 
 
This article surveys more precisely these Canadian debates about 
democratization and constitutional politics to better understand the significance of 
democratic deliberation in a concrete case, when principles are evoked in a context 
where institutions, interests, identities and power also matter.  The article’s main 
argument is that Canadian scholars, like most scholars who have studied democratic 
deliberation, have not paid sufficient attention to the relationships between principles 
and motives, on the one hand, and interests, identities and power, on the other.  Those 
who trust the deliberative process tend to focus on the power of arguments, whereas the 
skeptics see only the arguments of power.  The more ambivalent majority sees both 
dimensions, but tends to treat them separately, as if arguments and power each had 
their moments.  In my own work, this is more or less how I have approached the 
question, some articles being more sensitive to the principles at stake, while others are 
more focused on power politics. 
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This article proposes to think of deliberation and power politics as closely 
intertwined and, in fact, impossible to separate.  Both processes, arguing and 
bargaining/dominating, take place in situations of conflict, when important ideas and 
interests are at stake.  They evolve concurrently, and one cannot be understood fully 
without the other.  Political conflicts render deliberation difficult, and sometimes prevent 
it but, in the end, they also make it unavoidable.  In this perspective, deliberation on 
rights and principles always has more importance than what proponents of ‘analgesia’ 
would suggest, but it is also more governed by agreed-upon rules and by explicit or 
implicit compromises than what could be inferred from an ‘agonistic’ standpoint.  A focus 
on the unavoidable association of power and arguments thus suggests that 
constitutional debates are in many ways similar to day-to-day politics (Bellamy and 
Schönlau, 2004).  It may not be helpful or even feasible to separate analytically these 
two aspects of political life, or to seek to limit deliberative processes to specific policy 
issues. 
 
  The first three sections recapitulate the evolution of Canada’s political 
deliberations and survey scholarly interpretations that have celebrated, deplored, or 
puzzled at the impact of a more open deliberative process on the country’s constitutional 
debates.  This survey shows how divided and ambivalent the Canadian scholarly 
literature is on the question.  The fourth section broadens the argument to the general 
literature on democratic deliberation and proposes a modest but empirically grounded 
alternative to theories of deliberation that abstract from the real context of politics.  The 
fifth part then returns to early Canadian history to suggest that contemporary difficulties 
may not be as new as is often assumed and to draw some lessons from past 
constitutional processes, undoubtedly defined by power as much as by principles.  The 
conclusion discusses briefly the theoretical and political significance of an approach to 
deliberation that is more attentive to the interplay of arguments, interests, and power, 
and thus more sensitive to the difficulties but also to the possibilities of democratic 
deliberation in divided societies. 
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1. Canadian Constitutional Politics: For the Few, For the Many, For Nobody 
 
Canadian constitutional politics has long been primarily for the few.  After the 
adoption of the British North America Act, in 1867, the country’s institutions were, for a 
long period, relatively stable and immune from popular pressures.  There were, of 
course, significant tensions and crises, associated with the different national, regional 
and social cleavages (see Simeon and Robinson, 1990: 36-46, 64-73, 92-102, and 131-
40).  Canadian politics, however, remained driven largely by elite bargaining, and 
progress proved limited and gradual.  “This was a period of micro-constitutional politics,” 
writes Peter Russell.  “The changes were made one at a time, with a minimum of public 
involvement” (1993: 64).  In Canadian political science, this relative absence of the 
citizens was conceptualized with references to brokerage politics, cooperative or 
executive federalism, and consociationalism.  Beyond their differences, these 
approaches all underlined, and sometimes celebrated, the centrality of elite bargaining 
in the country’s political life (see Noël, 1994: 67-68). 
 
Change first came from within Quebec.  With the Quiet Revolution, in the early 
1960s, Quebec politics changed dramatically.  After a long period defined by a defensive 
and conservative search for autonomy within the Canadian federation — “l’hiver de la 
survivance” (Dumont, 1993: 324-26) — Quebec nationalism was reconstructed as a pro-
active and progressive quest for economic and social development, and for national 
recognition and autonomy.  In Canada, reactions were mixed, some forces pushing for 
accommodation, others for a strong affirmation of a one-nation perspective.  At the end 
of the 1960s, a new equilibrium had been found.  Canada would not become, formally at 
least, a multinational federation; there would be only one nation, defined by two official 
languages and a multicultural heritage (McRoberts, 1997). 
 
More changes, however, would come from Quebec.  Indeed, the Quiet Revolution 
was primarily an internal transformation of Quebec politics and society.  First, the old 
political culture of patronage and anti-statism, particularly prominent in Quebec, was 
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ended through political reforms that reinforced controls over political expenditures and 
severely limited private contributions to political parties.  The 1977 law on the financing 
of political parties, in particular, was a major democratic breakthrough — with no 
parallels in Canada or elsewhere in the world — which profoundly transformed Quebec 
politics (Heintzman, 1983).  Second, an active and confident civil society emerged in the 
period, with the strongest trade unions in North America, a solid and influential women’s 
movement, and a host of other social movements.  In turn, this evolution led business 
interests to organize themselves, thus creating conditions favorable to new forms of 
tripartite or multipartite collaboration (Noël, 2003b).  Third, a new political culture and a 
strong civil society made it possible to end, through political reforms and collective 
actions, the linguistic division of labor, and of incomes, that had characterized Quebec 
society for almost a century (see Noël, 1993; Levine, 1997).  This last achievement was 
truly remarkable, a rare instance of success in ending what Charles Tilly would describe 
as a “durable inequality” (1998). 
 
The emergence of a more democratic, more organized, and more egalitarian 
society reinforced Quebec’s traditional quest for recognition and autonomy within the 
Canadian federation, and paved the way for a more ambitious proposition: Quebec 
sovereignty in association with Canada.  This evolution, however, also meant that the 
objective had to be achieved in a new, more open and democratic way.  In 1973, the 
Parti québécois promised to hold a referendum on sovereignty if it was elected and in 
1978, now in power, it adopted Quebec’s law on popular consultation.  For the first time 
in Canadian history, the people were considered directly sovereign in constitutional 
matters.  René Lévesque, then Premier of Quebec, noted the unprecedented character 
of the approach when he launched the Quebec referendum debate in 1980: 
 
We are not used to rendezvous like this referendum, it is the first time in 
our entire history that such an occasion arises to decide by ourselves, 
collectively, what we want to be and what direction we want to take for the future 
(Lévesque, quoted in Resnick, 1990 : 101; author’s translation) 
 
As a deliberative exercise, a referendum has many drawbacks.  It forces voters 
into an either/or choice, for a short but dramatic duration, and does not make a genuine 
 8 
conversation easy.  A referendum can indeed be used to close rather than to open 
popular debates, as was the case with the 2002 British Columbia “referendum” on native 
rights.  Even when it is not intended, the end result is likely to be closure.  This is what 
happened following the 1992 Charlottetown Accord referendum. 
 
Still, in the context of a country where popular sovereignty had never been 
affirmed, the 1980 referendum marked a breakthrough and established new political 
rules, at least in Quebec (Atkinson, 1994: 735).  The rest is well-known history.  In 1982, 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau lured René Lévesque by alluding to a possible referendum on the 
constitution, a possibility that appealed to Lévesque but not to the Premiers who were 
his allies, and he then proceeded to transform the constitution without the approval of 
the Quebec government (and without popular consultation).  The 1987 Meech Lake and 
1992 Charlottetown Accords failed to correct the situation created in 1982, but they 
opened a broad pan-Canadian debate over the constitution, a debate that engaged 
citizens in the process as never before, but eventually led to a political impasse. 
 
In 1982, the constitution of the country had been changed with little citizen 
engagement, except for last-minute concessions in response to the demands of 
women’s groups and Aboriginal peoples.  Five years later, in 1987, such an elitist 
approach no longer seemed possible.  The idea that the constitution could be amended 
by the negotiations of “eleven men” gathered in a closed room had become 
unacceptable.  One cannot avoid noting that this preoccupation for process only 
emerged when the English-speaking majority felt overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the 
outcome, and disappeared later on, when more palatable agreements were signed 
behind closed doors (the 1999 Social Union Framework Agreement is a case in point; 
see Noël, 2000: 32).  Whatever the case, Canadian constitutional politics had now 
entered a new era, marked by citizen involvement and demands for more open 
deliberations.  The 1992 referendum confirmed the trend, and convinced many in 
Canada that an era when elites could strike compromises had ended and, with it, the 
possibility of changing the constitution. 
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First debated among the few, Canadian constitutional politics finally had reached 
the many, but only to end up being for nobody, that is closed for all practical purposes.  
It is now taken as self-evident that the country’s constitution and basic institutions cannot 
be amended, except at the margins.  Merely evoking the possibility of such changes 
tends to be seen as futile, if not irresponsible. 
 
2. Assessing the Country’s Constitutional Impasse 
 
Political scientists, philosophers and intellectuals have been preoccupied by this 
outcome, an unforeseen consequence of a long and broad debate to which, collectively, 
they have contributed with energy and conviction.  If we abstract from the necessary 
nuances and minor points, four general interpretations can be distinguished: a lament for 
a simpler, less diverse, and less participatory past; a lament for a more reasonable, just 
as diverse but less participatory past; a celebration of democracy, from a majoritarian 
perspective; and a celebration of both democracy and multiplicity.  Figure 1 presents 
these four interpretations along the two axes that define the authors’ respective 
positions.  The horizontal axis refers to the authors’ more or less positive evaluations of 
democratization; the vertical axis to their views about social diversity, an aspect of the 
question that is related to democratization but distinct.2  Two authors are identified in 
each quadrant, as representative of the position thus defined. 
 
                                            
2 The term democratization is used here as defined by Dryzek.  It refers not so much to 
the establishment of the basic institutional conditions for democracy, but rather to the 
process through which democracy progresses.  “The democratic life,” writes Dryzek, 
“consists in large part of searching for democracy.”  “(…) any worthwhile political future 
involves progressive democratization, not just in terms of the geographical spread of 
existing institutions widely thought to merit description as democratic, but also through a 
deepening of the democratic qualities of key arenas of life” (1996: 4-5).  Michel Callon, 
Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe present in similar terms “the democratization of 
democracy” as a widely shared, broad and open aspiration that is inherent to democratic 
life (2001: 166 and 326). 
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Figure 1: Four Assessments of Canada’s Constitutional Impasse 
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Lament/          Celebration/ 
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Ajzenstat  Trudeau 
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Individualism/Integration 
  
Consider, first, the lament for a simpler past.  For political scientists like Janet 
Ajzenstat and Michael Lusztig, it was both the democratization of the constitutional 
process and the politics of recognition that led to an impasse.  Ajzenstat links the two 
issues explicitly: “liberal democratic theory warns against popular participation in the 
process of drawing up a new constitution and, secondly, (…) the participation of political 
groups, interests, and individual Canadians in the negotiations is heightening 
contestation in the constitutional arena and hastening the country’s breakup.” (1994: 
112).  For her, the politics of recognition “has introduced a new and dangerously 
intolerant kind of divisiveness,” and increasing participation will only make matters 
worse.  Participation, in fact, offers a “remedy” that can only kill the “patient” (118).  
Michael Lusztig presents the same views with a different language.  To ensure that 
democratization appears unsavory, Lusztig refers to it as “mass input/legitimization.”  
This “mass” process, he argues, “undermines effective elite accommodation” and “is a 
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catalyst for the creation of constitutional interest groups” that will just increase conflicts 
(1994: 748).  Lusztig and Ajzenstat stand in a specific quadrant because they deplore 
not only public participation but also the expression of multiple identities and the multi-
faceted demands that characterize contemporary constitutional politics.  To them, these 
demands cannot be differentiated on the basis of important principles; they merely 
reflect “the jockeying of organized groups and interests” (Ajzenstat, 1994: 120; and 
2003: 140-43).  Lusztig even refuses to see anything specific about the constitutional 
orientations of Quebec or of the Aboriginal peoples.  The latter, in particular, are treated 
as one among many expressions of “minoritarianism,” driven by the force of the 
“Aboriginal lobby” (1994: 753-54).  In the end, all of these “constitutional rent-seekers” — 
“each with an axe to grind” — have no strong claim, nothing more in any case than 
would have a hypothetical “collectivity of socially malcontent anarchist poets” (Lusztig, 
1999: 469-70).  Ajzenstat and Lusztig thus deplore the end of elite accommodation — 
although one wonders what there is to accommodate in a country with no genuine 
diversity — and regret the loss of the “neutral constitution.”  Theirs is truly an elitist, 
majoritarian lament.  Ajzenstat sees no solution now that that “Pandora’s constitutional 
box is open,” except a fragile status quo and a politics of “muddling through” that can 
best be preserved by “apathy” (Ajzenstat, 1994: 122 and 126; and 2003: 139). Lusztig, 
for his part, simply concludes that  “the Dream of One Canada is over” (James and 
Lusztig, 2002: 101). 
 
 A second position expresses what could be called a lament for a more 
reasonable past.  We find here the same worries about democratization but more 
openness, if not enthusiasm, about diversity and the need for recognition.  Michael 
Atkinson, for instance, agrees with Ajzenstat and Lusztig about the association of 
democratic participation with “constitutional deadlock,” but he diverges markedly from 
them in his assessment of the politics of recognition (1994: 745).  Whereas the latter 
flatten all constitutional demands into interest group rent-seeking, Atkinson deplores 
precisely that the new political context fails to make room for “the idea that some groups 
have a prior claim on recognition because they derive their identity from a set of 
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processes that have recognized them in the past” (743).3  Likewise, Peter Russell, a 
distinguished representative of the “lament for a more reasonable past” view, considers 
that Canada can no longer deny “the new creed of popular sovereignty” and go back to 
elite accommodation, now that “the genie is clearly out of the bottle” (1993: 5-6).  The 
problem, notes Russell, is that Canadians have not agreed, and probably cannot agree, 
to form a single people united by a social contract.  The best hope for the country is to 
cling to what is left of its traditional understanding of diversity and consent.  Canadians, 
concludes Russell, must realize that “they are after all the people of Edmund Burke, not 
John Locke, and that their social contract is essentially organic, not covenantal.  Some 
of us might settle for that” (235). 
 
 A third standpoint can be defined as favorable to democratization but majoritarian 
in its understanding of diversity and recognition.  Pierre Elliott Trudeau is the prominent 
representative here.  Trudeau’s rejection of a national status for Quebec and, at least 
initially, for Aboriginal peoples, and his commitment to an uncompromising liberal 
individualism are well known.4  Was he, however, favorable to democratization?  In a 
sense, yes, but within the limits set by his opposition to existing national identities.  First, 
one should recall that in his early writings Trudeau presented as a fundamental problem 
the lack of a strong democratic tradition in Canada: 
 
 Historically, French Canadians have not really believed in democracy for 
themselves; and English Canadians have not really wanted it for others.  Such 
are the foundations upon which our two ethnic groups have absurdly pretended to 
be building democratic forms of government.  No wonder the ensuing structure 
has turned out to be rather flimsy.  (1968: 103) 
 
                                            
3 In his survey of the question, Matthew Mendelsohn (2000) places the three authors 
more or less in the same camp because he focuses on the horizontal dimension of 
Figure 1.  These authors are, indeed, on the elitist side of the Figure, but their views of 
diversity and recognition (the vertical axis) are fundamentally at odds. 
4 A good synthesis is presented in Karmis and Gagnon (2001 : 150-61). 
 13 
 Trudeau’s constitutional program was meant, in part, to build a less “flimsy” 
structure, and to better anchor individual and linguistic rights in the constitution.  There 
was a rhetorical and calculating dimension to the project of a “just society” centered on 
individual rights and defined by official bilingualism and multiculturalism, but the project 
was also a democratic one.  At the same time, Trudeau was very much a political realist, 
always aware of the importance of power and manipulation.  He made little efforts, for 
instance, to improve, or even to consider improving, existing practices regarding the 
financing of political parties, which he had denounced in his writings (Simpson, 1988; 
Whitaker, 1991).  In power, he liked to refer to the people and sometimes evoked the 
possibility of a referendum, but in the end he always stuck to the traditional practices of 
executive federalism (Atkinson, 1994: 736; Buzzetti, 2003).  Trudeau’s appeal to an 
abstract Canadian people composed of undifferentiated rights-bearing individuals was in 
fact at the core of his political action, and it helps account for the tension between 
democratization and majoritarianism in his thought and actions.  To undermine the idea 
of an old compact between nations at the origins of the federation, Trudeau conceived 
the Charter as establishing “the sovereignty of the people,” a single people where “no 
one is special” (Trudeau, quoted in LaSelva, 1996: 90).  Such a logic effectively pitted 
democratization against recognition and even, to a large extent, against federalism.  At 
times, for instance, Trudeau simply overlooked the division of sovereignty inherent to 
federalism, to claim that the Members of Parliament were the only group in the country 
able to “express the national will and the national interest” (Trudeau, quoted in 
McRoberts, 2001: 702).  In principle, this “national will” was taken as the will of a nation 
composed of minorities; effectively, it was the will of the majority (LaSelva, 1996: 89-98). 
 
 The same antinomies are found, in less sophisticated ways, in John Saul’s essay 
on Canada, where the author claims that this country is “a nation of minorities” poorly 
governed by elites that have “lost contact with our reality” (1997: 10 and 127).  Like 
Trudeau, Saul invents an abstract people that is not defined significantly by any national 
or linguistic cleavage (“we”), that is rarely well represented by its elites (“them”), and that 
happens to think … just like John Saul (“us;” 1997: 222-23)! 
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 The democratization envisioned by Trudeau and Saul emphasizes what John 
Dryzek calls “franchise” and “scope,” at the expense of “authenticity.”  It seeks to make 
the participation of the more vulnerable groups possible and easier (through 
multiculturalism policies and the Charter), and to expand “the domains of life under 
democratic control” (linguistic rights, for instance), but it fails to consider authenticity, 
“the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic” (Dryzek, 
1996: 5).  This is why Trudeau and Saul need to invent an abstract people and to refrain 
from actual public consultations.  Indeed, when taken seriously, the ideal of authenticity 
— a key component of the search for democratization — calls for the effective 
participation of various stakeholders and, in a multinational society, this leads 
unavoidably to the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1992: 28).5 
 
 In the last quadrant are authors who value both multiplicity and democratization.  
There are many variants here, and they will be discussed further below.  Some authors  
— like Charles Taylor (1991), Jeremy Webber (1994: 312-19), Will Kymlicka (1998: 175-
83) and Charles Blattberg (2003a) — pay more attention to the politics of recognition 
and favor, in a rather abstract way, the pursuit of the country’s “conversation.”  Others 
place more emphasis on democratization, and explore possible democratic avenues 
toward recognition (see, for instance, Mendelsohn, 2000; Tully, 2001; Maclure, 2003).  
The latter confront directly the question raised here, which has to do with the possibilities 
                                            
5 In Citizens Plus, Alan Cairns struggles with this antinomy and seeks to reconcile 
majoritarianism with some form of recognition for Aboriginal peoples (2000).  Cairns still 
clings, however, to the majoritarian impulse, which he sees as essential and imperiled 
by Aboriginal self-government.  In his insistence on the institutional difficulties 
associated with recognition, Cairns is also close to authors on the left side of the figure.  
Contrary to them, however, he celebrates the advent of broad citizen participation and 
the emergence of a “never-ending” constitutional dialogue.  Yet, Cairns wishes a country 
defined by its unity of purpose and endowed with stable institutions (see Dobrowolsky 
and Devlin, 2002: 94-5 and 119).  In many ways, and this is not a critique, Cairns stands 
close to the analytical and political crossroads, but in the end he remains on the 
majoritarian side. 
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and potential of democratic deliberation in a multinational federation.  But, as we will 
see, they also leave important questions unaddressed. 
 
3. Can Deliberation Be Achieved? 
 
 Among the authors who value both democratization and the recognition of the 
country’s diversity, one can find quite distinctive views about the possibility of achieving 
a workable democratic political order in a multinational federation.  At the risk, once 
again, of oversimplifying, it is possible to distinguish four standpoints, according to the 
importance granted respectively to power and arguments, and to the relative optimism or 
pessimism of each author.  Figure 2 presents, on the left side, authors who stress the 
arguments of power.  Scholars in the lower quadrant see little possibilities for an 
opening, whereas those in the upper quadrant are just as sensitive to institutional and 
political constraints but see possibilities in institutional design.  On the right side of the 
Figure are authors who place more emphasis on the power of arguments, and are either 
pessimistic or optimistic about the coming years in Canada. 
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Figure 2: Four Assessments of Democratic Deliberation in a Multinational 
Federation 
 
Optimistic 
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Among scholars who insist on institutions and political power, most are 
pessimistic about the possibilities of reaching a satisfying accommodation in Canada.  
Kenneth McRoberts, for instance, presents the recent history of the country as a missed 
opportunity to adjust both institutions and practices to the reality of a multinational 
federation.  From his point of view, it was not for lack of a good understanding of the 
challenges facing the federation that Canada was “misconceived,” but rather because 
those who believed in a less diverse or pluralistic federation successfully used the 
majority’s preferences as a lever to impose their favored solution (1997).  The result, 
argues McRoberts, is an unstable construct that is at best an impasse and at worst 
doomed to fail (2001: 713).  Michel Seymour pushes the argument further with a survey 
of recent federal policies aimed at undermining Quebec’s national identity in favor of the 
 17 
new Canadian nationalism, policies that also include more authoritarian measures such 
as the Clarity Act (2001: 125-41).  The federal government, argues Seymour, has 
negated both democratization and recognition, and there is no way out, unless 
Quebeckers opt for sovereignty.  Because they value democratization and recognition, 
McRoberts and Seymour would agree with Dryzek that ‘analgesia,’ which they see as 
the dominant political position, is unsatisfying.  They would not settle, however, for a 
restrictive politics of issue-specific deliberations, because such an approach would fail 
as well to address the country’s core problems. 
 
Authors like Philip Resnick and Matthew Mendelsohn are also sensitive to the 
role of institutions and power and they concur to a large extent with McRoberts’ 
assessment.  They place some hope, however, on political and institutional reforms that 
would make possible new, more democratic forms of accommodation.  Resnick, for 
instance, considers other federations and proposes a new institutional arrangement that 
would distinguish provinces, region-provinces, and a nation-province, admitting in the 
same breath that for now there is not much appetite for such reforms in Canada (2000 
and 2001).  From a more specific perspective, Mendelsohn considers different 
deliberative ideas and experiments and suggests that there “may be more useful 
frameworks for thinking about constitutional change in Canada than traditional models of 
executive federalism and consociationalism.”  For him, new deliberative approaches 
could make it possible to include the public in the process “in a nonmajoritarian manner,” 
thus opening an avenue for change (2000: 270-71).  Like Resnick, Mendelsohn is fully 
aware that the path toward change is narrow: “the discourse of undifferentiated equality 
is deeply anchored and parties challenge this philosophy at their peril” (2002: 76).  Still, 
he thinks that a coalition defending a more flexible, more accommodating federalism 
remains possible (2002: 76-77).  In some ways, Mendelsohn’s approach is not far from 
the pragmatic perspective advocated by Dryzek.  It insists, however, on the unavoidable 
character of core constitutional issues, even though the prospects for change appear 
limited. 
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The authors in the lower right quadrant are not far from Mendelsohn’s position.  
Like him, and like all authors in Figure 2, they value deliberation and multiplicity.  They 
would probably be more pessimistic, however, about the possibilities of institutional 
design, and be closer in this sense to McRoberts and Seymour, who stress difficulties 
more than possibilities. Contrary to the latter, however, they insist on pursuing the 
“Canadian conversation,” even though they offer little reason to think that this 
conservation can be fruitful.  Beyond their differences, Samuel LaSelva and Will 
Kymlicka both consider that the current impasse could be solved if Canadians were 
willing to make concessions.  LaSelva concludes his book with the assertion that “the 
existence of Canada requires Canadians (…) to come to terms with asymmetrical 
federalism” (1996: 195).  Kymlicka proposes, more prudently but in a similar manner, to 
“adopt a more flexible and open-minded approach” toward multiculturalism and national 
minorities (1998: 182-83).6  Ideas, here, come first.  But the potential for deliberation 
appears unpromising, because the majority remains reluctant to accept the necessary 
approach.  Citizens seem caught in a sort of ‘agonistic’ impasse. 
 
Jeremy Webber offers a more compelling reason to pursue the “Canadian 
conversation” and, because of this, he leaves open more possibilities.  The conversation 
must continue, he proposes, not because it leads to the one good solution, or even to 
some sort of working compromise, but simply because the conversation itself — “the 
way in which (the people of this country) have cooperated, disagreed, and in the end 
shaped each other” — is what constitutes Canada as a country (1994: 319).  James 
Tully pushes this ‘agonistic’ intuition further, and argues that a stable and theoretically 
determined outcome simply can never be reached: 
 
The language of constitutionalism and struggles for recognition disposes 
us to presume that there is some definitive and permanent system of rules of 
mutual recognition, some definitive configuration (…) on which all agree.  (…)  But 
this is false.  ‘[I]nevitably, there will be dissenting voices.’  What is definitive and 
                                            
6 Charles Taylor is also clear on this count, and concludes an analysis of the question 
with a plea for pluralism: “So let us recognize this now and take the road of deep 
diversity together” (1991). 
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permanent is the democratic discussion and alteration of the rules over time.  The 
members accept and respect this or that system of rules of recognition not 
because they agree on the system in virtue of some shared conception of justice, 
but because the rules are open to dissent, fair consideration and amendment.  
(Tully, 2001: 14-15)7 
 
In this perspective, the “continuous contests of mutual disclosure and 
acknowledgement” are “the activity of democratic freedom itself” (22), and citizens 
themselves must be the agents of change: 
 
It is no longer assumed that the forms of recognition of members of a 
constitutional democracy can be determined outside the political process itself, by 
theoretical reason discovering the a priori forms of universal memberships 
(individuals, nations, corporations, provinces and so on).  Also, it is no longer 
assumed that a consociational elite is capable of making the determination by 
some form of accommodation behind the back of citizens.  It is now widely argued 
in theory and practice that the identities worthy of recognition must be worked out 
and decided on by the members of the association themselves, through the 
exercise of practical reason in negotiations and agreements.  (Tully, 2001: 24) 
 
By paying attention to dissent, conflicts and instability, Tully distances himself 
from the idea that a good theory can offer a satisfying answer to the politics of 
deliberation and recognition in a multinational federation, and he gives content to 
Webber’s intuition about the critical and constitutive importance of the country’s 
historical conversation, with all its limitations and disagreements.  Tully nevertheless 
avoids the pitfalls of ‘agonism’ underlined by Dryzek, because he remains committed to 
“the exercise of practical reason in negotiations and agreements.”  His views, still, are 
bound to face a number of objections.  Among these, it is worth considering two 
potential arguments.  The first claims that such an open approach can only lead to 
instability and conflict, and would be rejected rapidly by a majority satisfied with the 
status quo.8  A second objection contends that an established state simply would not 
                                            
7 Tully quotes a sentence from the 1998 Supreme Court of Canada’s Reference re 
Secession of Quebec. 
8 Kymlicka makes a similar point with reference to Webber and Taylor (1998: 176).  
Maclure also acknowledges the importance of this argument (2003: 16). 
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allow such an open process of deliberation to develop, especially if national unity is at 
stake.9  Both objections raise the issue of power and send us back, in a sense, to the 
bottom left quadrant of Figure 2, where power is everything and deliberation almost 
nothing.  In an opposite direction, one could claim that the process envisioned by Tully is 
simply too driven by conflicts and negotiations to make room for a genuine conversation 
(see Blattberg, 2003a and 2003b).  This objection also sends us back to the bottom left 
quadrant, unless one can identify the political and institutional conditions necessary for a 
satisfyingly genuine conversation, a challenging demand in contemporary Canada. 
 
These objections go well beyond Tully’s approach, which is remarkably balanced 
in associating the requirements of deliberation with the reality of conflicts.  They relate to 
the more general difficulty, in both political science and political philosophy, in thinking 
concurrently about democratic deliberation and political power.  Predominantly, the 
study of politics has been a study of interests, institutions and force, focused on 
bargaining and power, with some attention being occasionally paid to ideas, considered 
as intervening variables.  In recent years, the study of democratic deliberation has 
brought back a more traditional understanding of politics as a forum, where ideas and 
arguments are exchanged, evolve over time, and matter in their own right.  It remains 
unclear, however, how exactly deliberation proceeds and matters in a context defined by 
interests, conflicts, and power. 
 
This question is, of course, a theoretical one.  But it also has important practical 
implications.  The lack of a working conciliation of these two dimensions of politics may 
help to explain, for instance, the remarkable gap that exists between Canadian 
scholarship on federalism and the country’s political life.  There is a “total disjunction,” 
observes McRoberts, between the leadership Canadian scholars have taken in 
theorizing multinational federalism and the evolution of the political realm in this country, 
which has denied this possibility, and effectively moved in the opposite direction (2001: 
                                            
9 This argument underlies Seymour’s critique of Tully’s positive views on the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Reference re Secession of Quebec (Seymour, 2001: 147-60). 
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694 and 710).  Can we rebuild the connection, and think of democratic deliberation as a 
real, through and through, political activity? 
 
4. Democratic Deliberation as a Political Activity 
 
In political theory, democratic deliberation is usually contrasted with the interplay 
of interests and power, the two dynamics being seen as mutually exclusive (Dryzek, 
2000: 2).  In this perspective, arguing is successful precisely when it is sheltered from 
bargaining and domination.  This separation can be achieved theoretically by assuming 
an ideal speech situation, which can then be used as a benchmark to assess concrete 
situations (see Chambers, 1996: 155-62), or else it can be sought through institutional 
design, with the introduction of procedures and approaches more conducive to 
deliberation (see Dryzek, 1990: 40-48).  Most authors recognize that, in fact, arguing 
never takes place in a vacuum, away from interests, bargaining and power.  They 
nevertheless tend to think about deliberation as happening in a distinct realm, or at a 
different moment, as far as possible from day-to-day politics.  On the other side, of 
course, are authors who see only bargaining and power, and implicitly embrace the 
same dichotomy. 
 
The question is posed very differently if, on the contrary, we start from the 
premise that deliberation and power politics are always closely intertwined and, in fact, 
impossible to separate.  From this perspective, both processes, arguing and 
bargaining/dominating, take place in situations of conflict, when important ideas and 
interests are at stake.  They evolve concurrently, and one cannot be understood fully 
without the other.  Discourse itself is penetrated, and to some extent constituted, by 
power and resistance (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 93 and 116-28; Risse, 2000: 17-18).  This does 
not mean that deliberations can be reduced to power relations, but it does imply that 
they cannot be understood out of their context, as somehow outside of power relations.  
Likewise, all power relations are legitimated by norms and arguments about justice, and 
it is a mistake to underestimate the political importance of such discourses (Risse, 2000: 
17).  The very decision to act unilaterally, to negotiate, or to deliberate is guided by 
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norms and social and institutional rules, and unilateral and negotiated actions 
themselves are shaped by language and shared social understandings (Müller, 2004: 
412-13). 
 
Put differently, if principles were not at stake, bargaining and domination would 
hardly be political, and they would become more akin to trade or organized crime.  If, on 
the other hand, interests, identities and power were set aside or ignored, deliberating 
would appear facile, and would be more an exercise in pure rhetoric than a genuinely 
political undertaking.  The key analytical question, then, has to do with what could be 
called — in Keynesian terms — the weight of the arguments, the relative importance of 
ideas and power in a given case, at a specific moment (Risse, 2000: 18; Magnette, 
2004; on this Keynesian notion, see Noël, 1995). 
 
From this perspective, democratic deliberation can be seen as a normal “joint 
social activity, embedded in the social action of dialogue — the give and take of 
reasons” (Bohman, 1996: 32).  Success does not require unanimity or even agreement, 
but simply that agents be “sufficiently convinced to continue their ongoing co-operation”.  
The aim, write Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, is not to find a consensus or the one best 
solution, but rather to reach a “robust” outcome, one that integrates various standpoints 
and preoccupations and allows the collective learning process to continue in a 
democratic way (2001: 16 and 55).  Normally, this happens when the different sides can 
“recognize that they have contributed to and influenced the outcome, even when they 
disagree with it” (33).  Disagreements remain — without them there would be no need 
for deliberation — but ideas and representations have evolved.  To quote again from 
Bohman: “Each speaker incorporates and reinterprets the other’s contributions in his or 
her own.  After a sufficient length of time, speakers begin to use expressions that they 
did not employ before; the process of trying to convince others may alter not only one’s 
own mode of expression but also the reasons one finds convincing” (58). Each 
participant’s understanding of the common situation is reshaped as it incorporates other 
points of view and reasons.  Deliberation generates “uptake.”  It remolds the different 
arguments through reciprocal influences. 
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 Deliberation may concern broad issues of rights, more specific policy issues, or 
even “unpretentious claims for decency” anchored in local notions of “honor and justice” 
(on the latter, see Sabel, 1982: xiii, 132, and 189).  The general idea is the same: in a 
democracy, policies and practices cannot simply derive from earlier forms or emanate 
from unmediated power struggles.  Changes must be justified with public reasons, which 
will always be contested but usually will be accepted as worth discussing, or at least 
acknowledged as legitimate (Bohman, 1996: 91 and 100; Risse, 2000; Stone, 2002: 34).  
This dialogic process shapes politics in many ways, just as the demands of politics 
shape public deliberations. 
 
This understanding of public deliberation gives power to principles, because it 
grants contending conceptions of justice a genuine weight in the public arena, and it 
also anchors power relations into principles.  From this perspective, the language of 
politics is at the same time a moral and democratic language and an institutional and 
technocratic discourse.  This implies, among other things, that societies hardly ever go 
back.  The notion of moral progress is rarely discussed by political scientists or by 
political theorists, but the fact that there has been historical progress in public ideas 
about justice is hard to dispute.  Slavery or official racism, to take extreme but not so 
distant cases, are not likely to return as legitimate practices.  Closer to the current 
context, recent workfare initiatives simply could not be justified with the same moral 
arguments put forward in the nineteenth century to support similar policies (King, 1999: 
256).  Like science, moral language can be seen as a genuine cognitive discourse, 
which advances over time (Sayre-McCord, 1986; Gilbert, 1990: 7-11 and 111-16). 
 
Finally, democratic deliberation and power relations do not only forge public 
choices.  They also create and transform social actors and their relationships, as well as 
public practices and institutions.  In the give and take of arguments and of politics, new 
actors emerge, old ones are displaced or rejuvenated, and social arrangements are 
remade.    The logic at play is not causal, but constitutive (Wendt, 1999: 77-88 and 135). 
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The public “changes the conditions of political deliberation by changing itself” (Bohman, 
1996: 201). 
 
In the context of a multinational federation, the latter point is particularly 
important.  It means that peoples and social actors change themselves as well as others 
through their interactions.  If we also accept that arguments have weight, that there is 
“uptake” in the exchanges, and that there is moral progress over time, fears of an unruly 
and never-ending debate appear exaggerated.10  The constitutional representations of 
Canadian women, for instance, were not simply the narrow, divisive and endless claims 
of an “interest group.”  These representations defined new collective identities, 
contributed to open the political debate for all, and gave rise to new coalitions and 
compromises.  In sum, they made the country not less but more inclusive, coherent and 
legitimate (Dobrowolsky, 1998: 740-41; and 2000: 197 and 201).  Similarly, the 
recognition of Aboriginal peoples represents an historical step forward, which does call 
for further steps but cannot be questioned endlessly. 
 
Like Tully’s proposition, the approach outlined here suggests that there is no end 
to debates, no stable outcome that can be reached.  A greater attention to power 
relations, however, also indicates that Tully may see more institutional and political 
flexibility than there is in reality in the Canadian context.  In a specific social and political 
context, democratic deliberation always remains constrained.  This means that some 
outcomes are more likely than others, whether they are just or not.  Such constraints 
also imply, however, that social actors do not simply talk past each other, in an 
‘agonistic’ way.  Keen to promote an open democratic process, ‘agonistic’ proponents of 
deliberation have not always paid sufficient attention to the fact that the primary purpose 
of debating is to reach decisions on relatively stable rules.  Jocelyn Maclure, for 
                                            
10 This preoccupation about unbounded debates is not unique to Canadian scholarship 
and concerns the politics of deliberation in general (see Dryzek, 2000: 31-56).  Many 
students of multinational federalism have argued on empirical ground that the 
conversation should remain within reasonable boundaries (see Maclure, 2003: 16; 
Kymlicka, 1998: 182-83). 
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instance, presents moments of decision as “tragic but unavoidable,” as the dramas of 
political life (2000: 214).  Of course, decisions make winners and losers, in normal as 
well as in constitutional politics, but what would be the point of fighting for, say, a law to 
combat poverty and social exclusion, if no durable and effective decision were ever 
made (on this case, see Noël, 2002).  A constitution, observes Francis Delpérée in the 
Belgian context, should not be written on sand (2001). 
 
Can we draw a line between democratic openness and the rigidity necessary to 
create rules and institutions that matter?  Can a multinational federation like Canada, 
where the majority would prefer to close the constitutional debate, still engage in a 
fruitful deliberative process on issues of identity and recognition?  Can we even speak of 
a single Canadian debate?  Or do we already have, for all practical purposes, separate 
public spheres? 
 
  Philosophical and theoretical arguments cannot respond to these questions 
except to suggest that there is a middle way between ‘analgesia’ and ‘agonism,’ defined 
not by a narrowing of the range and scope of the issues under consideration but by a 
realist understanding of deliberation and of constitutional politics, as rule-bound debates 
defined by conflicts and by the possibility of accommodation more than by the elusive 
ideal of a rational and encompassing consensus (Bellamy and Schönlau, 2004: 417).  In 
this perspective, only a close analysis of the political context can inform us about the 
difficulties and the possibilities of deliberation in this period, in one specific multinational 
federation (Risse, 2000: 18; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 135; Maclure, 2003).  In the end, the best 
option is to trust the democratic process.  Rogers M. Smith, who very aptly shows how 
the construction and expression of stories of peoplehood are inextricably linked to 
concrete power politics — and to democracy as well — argues in favor of such a realist 
politics of contestation, whereby various groups and nations can seek to define and 
institutionalize new communities and, in the process, more or less “check each other’s 
excesses as they vie to win broad support in political contests” (2003: 156-60).  
 
5. Popular Consent in an Old Multinational Federation 
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 If democratic deliberation makes sense in a less than perfect context, and if 
Canadian politics is a public sphere where such deliberative practices take place, we 
should also be able to understand past developments from this perspective.  It is not 
possible, within the constraints of a short article, to go very far in this direction.  But 
consider, as an interesting illustration, the origins of the federation. 
 
The men who designed the Canadian federation in 1867 were not exactly friends 
of democracy as we understand it today.  “The weak point in democratic institutions’” 
said George-Étienne Cartier, “is the leaving of all power in the hands of the popular 
element.  The history of the past proves this is an evil.”  In the same vein, Thomas 
D’Arcy McGee saw the new Confederation as a protection against  “the risk of being 
swallowed up by the spirit of universal democracy that prevails in the United States” 
(Cartier and McGee, as quoted in Resnick, 1990: 76-77; see also Mendelsohn, 2000: 
248-49).  The Founding Fathers preferred a mixed constitution, with monarchical and 
aristocratic elements, and a limited franchise.  At the same time, however, they 
displayed a keen sense of the requirements of popular consent in a multinational 
federation.  Here is how John A. Macdonald, the country’s first Prime Minister, explained 
the need for a federal arrangement in Canada: 
 
I have always contented that if we could agree to have one government 
and one parliament, legislating for the whole of these peoples, it would be the 
best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest system of government 
we could adopt.  But, on looking at the subject in the [Quebec] Conference, and 
discussing the matter as we did, most unreservedly, we found that such a system 
was impracticable.  In the first place, it would not meet the assent of the people of 
Lower Canada, because they felt that in their peculiar position — being a 
minority, with a different language, nationality and religion from the majority — in 
case of a junction with the other provinces, their institutions and their laws might 
be assailed, and their ancestral associations, on which they prided themselves, 
attacked and prejudiced; it was found that any proposition which involved the 
absorption of the individuality of Lower Canada — if I may use the expression — 
would not be received with favour by her people. (Macdonald, in Waite, 1963: 40-
41). 
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This discourse is well known and often quoted in Canada, but its implications for 
a discussion of democratic deliberation in a “really existing” multinational federation have 
not been considered with sufficient attention.  Here is a key political leader who distrusts 
democracy and popular participation but seeks institutions that will meet the 
expectations and the favor of “the people of Lower Canada.”  One could argue that 
Macdonald was simply drawing conclusions from a bargaining process that had taken 
place among political elites, and making these conclusions legitimate by appealing to 
broader but relatively shallow principles.  Such a narrow interpretation would not explain, 
however, the importance, for Macdonald, of referring to the “assent of the people of 
Lower Canada,” and the weight he gave to political discussions carried “most 
unreservedly.”  Why was someone who did not support democracy paying so much 
attention to the views of others and to popular consent?  Why did he see these 
arguments about discussion and consent as important and politically effective?  How 
could he simultaneously oppose democracy and seek popular consent? 
 
The key to understand Macdonald’s views is contextual.  Like most men of his 
time, Macdonald associated democracy with direct democracy, and contrasted it with a 
mixed constitution and representative government, which he saw as a more feasible and 
preferable mode of government (Resnick, 1990: 71-87).  Representative government did 
not require universal suffrage — in time, the logic of a vote for all would impose itself — 
or an equality of status between persons of different social classes, but it was strongly 
anchored in the principle of popular consent, according to which the governed could only 
have obligations toward a government that they had first accepted as legitimate  (Manin, 
1996: 11-13, 113-15, 126).  Discussion also played a key role, not as a decision-making 
procedure but as a process that facilitated agreements and, in the end, made consent 
possible (Manin, 1996: 241-45).  This is why Macdonald stressed that he and his peers 
had discussed the matter “most unreservedly” before coming to the conclusion that only 
a federal arrangement would obtain the “assent of the people of Lower Canada” (see 
also: Ajzenstat, 2003: 48-89). 
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Whatever its reservations regarding popular participation, the theory of 
representative government was thus open to forms of deliberation, among the elites first 
but also with the people, at least indirectly.  The theory, however, was not as sensitive to 
the implications of diversity.  The republican tradition tended to see deliberation as a 
means to overcome differences, to find the general will or at least some joint 
understanding of the common good (Przeworski, 1991: 15; Ajzenstat, 2003: 78).  More 
fundamentally, the dominant political theories of the time assumed that a modern 
constitution should be constructed de novo, by founding fathers willing and able to break 
with the traditions and irregularities of ancient constitutions, to create new nations of 
equals (Tully, 1995: 58-70).  This understanding of modern constitutions was influential 
in Canada, and the country’s “fathers” were tempted by the idea of creating a new nation 
(LaSelva, 1996: 25, 38 and 99).  But they could not do so.  Even the 1840 Union Act, 
which imposed a unitary government for Lower and Upper Canada, had failed to prevent 
the emergence of a strong and very elaborate scheme of political dualism.    Unable to 
deny this tenacious social reality — which concerned a third of the population and was 
anchored in the country’s ancient constitution (Tully, 1995: 145-46 and 154-62) — 
Macdonald and his peers began to build what was perhaps the first modern federation 
designed to accommodate existing national differences (Burgess, 2001: 257). 
 
A similar but more oppressive evolution took place with respect to Aboriginal 
peoples.  Well before the creation of the modern Canadian federation, Aboriginal 
peoples had established a constitutional relationship with the state.  They were indeed 
“alone among Canadian citizens in having entered treaties with the Crown” (Macklem, 
2001: 136, 183 and 267).  As Patrick Macklem underlines, this relationship was long 
denied and negated: 
Throughout Canada’s history, governments and courts systematically 
ignored the spirit and intent of treaties between Aboriginal peoples and the 
Crown, devalued ancient forms of Aboriginal sovereignty, dispossessed 
Aboriginal peoples of their ancestral territories, and regarded as inferior the 
diverse cultures to which Aboriginal peoples claim allegiance.  (2001: 286-87) 
 
The creation of Canada in 1867, for instance, was for the Aboriginal peoples 
“entirely an imperial imposition” (Russell, 1993: 32).  Aboriginal peoples nevertheless 
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maintained a minimal constitutional standing, which they claimed, and which was 
indirectly acknowledged by governments and courts when they argued that these claims 
had been extinguished or that consent was no longer necessary in this case (Tully, 
1995: 138).  In the 1970s and 1980s, the claims of Aboriginal peoples would reemerge 
and become, once again, central to Canada’s constitutional debate. 
 
For all its democratic limitations, the constitutional politics of the late nineteenth 
century followed a path that was neither ‘analgesic’ nor ‘agonistic.’  Anchored in the 
immediate preoccupations of politicians and informed by the need to find workable 
accommodations, the process nevertheless displayed a tension between the principled 
search for uniformity typical of modern constitutions and the equally principled demands 
for recognition and for the preservation of diversity that were anchored in the country’s 
ancient constitution.  This tension pitted the idea of a new nation against the protection 
of established ways of life, and confronted the elites of the new state with the complex 
requirements of popular consent in a multinational federation.  The interplay of 
arguments, interests, and power relations was not what it is today, but it defined a new 
democracy and a new federation, which was built on a certain idea of continuity and 
consent and was conceived, at least indirectly, as multinational.11  The result proved 
lacking in many ways, but it was not a pure imposition or a strictly bargained outcome.  
Neither was it perfectly consensual nor cast in concrete forever.  No sooner was it 
adopted that the meaning of the BNA Act of 1867 became challenged, contested and 
reconstructed in various ways by the different sides (Silver, 1997: 218-19 and 250). 
 
                                            
11 Michael Asch aptly described Canada as an “indirect” — or implicit — association of 
peoples (1984: 79). 
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Conclusion 
 
 Like all deliberative processes of significance, the Canadian constitutional debate 
never was a nice and polite conversation, carried by well-meaning participants who had 
previously checked their interests and their advantages at the door.  It often involved 
tough bargaining or verged on plain domination, was always less than perfectly 
democratic, and incorporated many restrictions and constraints that disadvantaged 
some or many constituents.  This debate, however, was also anchored in principles 
about democracy, continuity, and consent, and it contributed to the establishment of 
important rights and relatively satisfying institutions and practices.  This deliberative 
process was, in other words, a real political process.  And it mattered very much. 
 
 The aim of this article was to consider the current Canadian constitutional 
impasse in light of the requirements and possibilities of democratic deliberation.  The 
article first surveyed Canadian scholarship on the question, and found tensions, among 
those who favor democratization and pluralism, between an emphasis on the 
possibilities inherent to the Canadian debates and an acknowledgement of the 
difficulties of power relations in this country.  It then proposed an understanding of 
deliberation that is not incompatible with the recognition of the role of interests and 
power in politics, and used the origins of the federation as an illustration. 
 
 Sensitive to the context and to both arguments and power relations, the approach 
outlined in this article cannot offer a theoretical or practical avenue out of the current 
Canadian constitutional impasse, nor can it provide a full-proof recipe for democratic 
deliberation in divided societies.  Still, it could help us see beyond the dichotomies that 
tend to define the study of both Canadian politics and democratic deliberation. 
 
In constitutional as in normal politics, some junctures and circumstances may be 
more favorable than others.  These periods, however, need not be exceptional moments 
when principles can be considered dispassionately so as to achieve a consensus.  Nor 
do they have to be prudently crafted and circumscribed exercises in cooperation, just a 
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step ahead of ‘analgesia.’  Democratic deliberation over difficult issues of rights and 
recognition never stops.  In one way or another, these issues permeate all political 
debates, and they continuously shape or engender rules and accommodations, albeit 
not always in a just, satisfying, or stable way.  The possibility of democratic deliberation 
rests precisely on the citizens’ capacity to develop principled arguments about these 
concerns, even in contexts strongly defined by power relations and not obviously 
favorable to deliberation. 
 
For the moment, in Canada, there appears to be limited possibilities for 
meaningful progress.  Debates, however, always go on, in one form or another.  
Canadians, for instance, are slowly coming to grasp with the requirements of aboriginal 
self-government, an issue easier to settle in principle than to define in concrete 
institutional terms (Cairns, 2000; Coates, 2000).  Some also see progress in the 
September 2004 opening to the language of asymmetry in the federation.  I have 
serious doubts in this case (Noël, 2004 and 2004-05).  Whatever the case, no matter 
how constrained they are, in time, in one way or another, our debates and arguments 
tend to catch up with our political and social practices. 
 
 For more dramatically divided societies, the perspective outlined here implies that 
successful democratic deliberation may still be achieved, even in contexts where power 
and interests have much weight.  Success, again, may depend less on limiting the 
franchise — or the range of involved participants — or the scope — the number and 
importance of issues to address — than on gambling on authenticity.  The ensuing 
process may remain well below the demanding standards of normative democratic 
theory, but it has more chances to be effective in giving rise, gradually, to a genuine 
public sphere, where less than perfect but real, meaningful, and legitimate 
communication can develop.  In Iraq, for instance, the new authorities have tackled 
directly the question of identity, to forge in April 2005 an elected government that is 
representative of the different components of a complex and very divided society.  Of 
course, the road between this fragile and to some extent artificial consociational 
arrangement and the emergence of a true public sphere will be a long and difficult one.  
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One should keep in mind, however, that even in the best conditions multinational 
deliberations always remain imperfect exercises in practical reason. 
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